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The Internet, particularly over the last decade, has attracted the interest of a great number 
of academics, having become a commonplace for many social scientists. Internet pen-
etration levels, together with the variety of tools and services available for its users, are 
affecting the economic, social and political behaviour of many citizens of societies across 
the world. In this latter political sphere, specialists have shown interest in the effect of the 
Internet on citizens’ civic engagement, political participation and, generally, on the very 
political structure of democratic countries. 
	 In	this	field	of	research,	Bruce	Bimber	is	a	prominent	figure.	His	book	Information and 
American Democracy, one	of	his	most	representative	works,	is	a	point	of	reference	for	
the	field.	The	book	introduces	concepts	such	as	“information	regime”,	“post-bureaucratic	
pluralism”	and	“information	abundance”,	as	well	as	a	model	for	analysing	the	relationship	
between information and politics in the United States which have served as a reference 
for researchers interested in the subject. 
	 The	aim	of	this	debate	is	to	discuss,	eight	years	after	the	publication	of	this	book,	the	
relevance and importance of its fundamental approaches. In addition, we have attempted 
to revisit those ideas from the present time. Lastly, we have given this debate an interna-
tional scope in order to enrich it with perspectives and experiences from a varied range 
of countries. Thus, we have had a heterogeneous and comprehensive group of special-
ists including Steven Livingston (George Washington University), José Luis García (Uni-
versidad de Lisboa), Liu Gang (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Lorenzo Mosca 
(Universitá Roma Tre), David Karpf (Rutgers University) and José Manuel Robles (Uni-
versidad Complutense de Madrid). Following the comments of these authors, B. Bimber 
himself	offers	a	brief	review	of	his	work	and	provides	brief	responses	to	the	commenta-
tors’ comments. 
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The technological revolution driven by the Internet is on the minds of many people inter-
ested in politics now, and it has fueled a lot of discussion about political change and 
transformation. Without doubt, contemporary technology appears relevant to the chan-
ging organization of political interests, to collective action, and, perhaps, to levels of 
political	engagement.	But	just	what	shape	the	changes	will	take	is	not	yet	clear.		
 A promising route to placing the technological revolution in politics into context theo-
retically	and	historically	 is	 to	set	aside	the	details	of	specific	technologies.	Technology	
changes	too	rapidly	to	catalogue	in	a	way	that	has	lasting	significance,	and	it	is	crucial	to	
avoid	making	social	scientific	claims	tied	to	specific	software	or	technological	affordan-
ces	that	will	likely	be	supplanted	shortly.	Instead,	one	can	focus	on	the	nature	of	political	
information and communication itself. New technologies matter because they change 
the	distribution	and	cost	of	information	as	well	as	communication.	So	one	can	ask:	what	
is the relationship between changing characteristics of information in society and broad 
properties of democratic power and practice? This is a question of broad conceptual 
reach.  
 From the very birth of the American Constitution, this relationship has been at issue. 
A	widely	overlooked	aspect	of	the	Federalist	argument	in	1787-88	for	ratification	of	the	
proposed Constitution was a theory of political information. While Anti-Federalists argued 
that the national government would be too remote and distant from publics to be ade-
quately informed, or that it would collapse in complexity if it were made large enough to 
solve the problem of directly observing the needs of every community, Federalists made 
a more subtle observation. In no democracy of any size, they argued, can government 
directly observe the needs of the nation and act on each local fact, one after another. 
Most information reaching government must be mediated through institutional channels 
—importantly including state governments, they thought, in the case of the new American 
democracy. Mediated information arriving from many disparate sources would be supe-
rior,	Hamilton	argued,	 to	 first-hand	communication	and	observation,	because	 it	would	
be	broader	in	scope,	refined,	and	filtered.	It	could	be	reflexive	across	competing	inter-
ests, prioritized, and structured through representative institutions. The new government 
would	not	be	overwhelmed,	as	Anti-Federalists	argued,	but	would	flourish	as	the	nation’s	
“center	of	information,”	commanding	a	synthesis	of	information	impossible	to	assemble	
from decentralized perspectives in a confederation of states. In this way, early American 
political thought pointed to questions about how the structure of institutions and political 
organization shapes the quality of information and communication.
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 These questions would be relevant to several great changes in the course of Ame-
rican political development. On three occasions prior to the rise of the Internet, revolu-
tions in information and political organization occurred, each exhibiting political structures 
adapting	to	changing	characteristics	of	information	and	communication.	The	first	of	these	
coalesced	 in	 the	1820s	and	1830s,	making	possible	broad	political	participation	orga-
nized nationally by the political parties. The developments contributing crucially to this 
revolution were the spread of the Penny Press newspaper, which dropped the price of 
news by a factor of six, and the creation of the national postal service to move information 
around the country. By one estimate, between a third and half of all mail by weight in 
1820 was comprised of newspapers being exchanged between news businesses them-
selves	—the	first	national-scale	news	system.	In	1800,	elected	officials	had	little	way	to	
understand	the	nation	as	a	whole,	as	Hamilton	wanted	them	to,	and	 the	“Republican”	
citizen	in	Vermont	likely	had	little	in	common	with	the	“Republican”	in	South	Carolina.	By	
the	1840s,	the	post	office	and	press	together	created	a	political	communication	system	
that was crucial to the rise of coherent political identity on the part of citizens and the 
dramatic rise in voting rates. This system was crucial to the transformation of the early 
proto-parties.	 These	 had	 formed	 chiefly	 as	 legislative	 coalitions,	 but	 eventually	 could	
reach out beyond Congress to conduct political recruitment and mobilization. In short, the 
availability of a simple press-and-mail information system facilitated the rise and domi-
nance of the political party as the central political intermediary in the US.
 The ability of parties to completely dominate political information ended between 
1880	and	the	late	1910s.	A	different	kind	of	information	revolution	at	that	point	gave	rise	
to a new political intermediary. This revolution was one of complexity and specialization 
rather than the ability to distribute coordinated information at the national scale. Industria-
lization and urbanization led to an explosion in highly specialized information associated 
with the multiplication of social relationships and interests, as well as economic inter-
dependence and heterogeneity. These vastly increased created political complexity. A 
central result was the birth of the interest group. While the parties were information gene-
ralists who had mastered broad, news-based political communication since the 1830s, 
the new interest-based organizations were information specialists who rapidly mastered 
communication	linkages	between	specific	public	officials	or	agencies	and	the	multiplying	
constituencies	with	a	claim	 in	politics	—automobile	dealers,	doctors,	booksellers,	gro-
cers,	Danes,	Italians.	The	kinds	of	information	and	communication	functions	associated	
with	those	linkages	were	not	ones	that	national	parties	were	well	suited	to	perform.	The	
changes did not displace the party system, though Progressive reforms chastened the 
parties substantially. It fed the emergence of the pluralistic system of American politics, 
with	highly	resource-dependent	intermediaries	brokering	important	aspects	of	distribute	
political communication. 
 The rise of broadcasting after the middle of the 20th Century has been widely com-
mented upon, and indeed it constitutes a third information revolution. Again, a new tech-
nology-dependent possibility arose, namely commanding the attention of national-scale 
mass	audience.	This	again	gave	the	advantage	to	new	kinds	of	political	structures:	highly	
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centralized,	extremely	resource-dependent,	market-based	organizations.	In	the	elec-
toral	realm	these	were	the	candidate	campaign	organization	linked	to	for-profit	media	
businesses	selling	access	to	the	national	audience,	and	more	generally	 the	network	
television news business. The rise of television-centric politics in the US has been 
more than well documented by scholars, but what has been less well noticed is what 
this development had in common with previous revolutions: new political structures 
and a different system of funding political communication adapted to exploit changes 
in the character of information and communication made possible by technology. It was 
another case of organizational form and the structure and cost of information moving 
together. 
 By the time of the rise of the Internet —the fourth information revolution— a clear 
pattern was visible in American political development, playing out in new ways the old 
theme of the Federalist debate about the relationship of information to political struc-
ture.	Because	policy	and	political	influence	often	does	flow	to	the	most	well	informed,	
changes in the structure and distribution of political information —more or less directly 
arising from technological innovation— leads to changes in the structure of political 
intermediaries. These intermediaries, whether parties, interest groups, community 
associations, or campaign organizations, adapt and exploit the characteristics of infor-
mation and communication present during particular eras of American politics. As they 
do, they reinforce the value and structure of information. These stable arrangements 
constitute a political information regime —particular political organizations adapted to 
a particular ecology of information and communication. A regime lasts until new forces 
change the cost, distribution, or other characteristics of information in society. 
 The main features of the fourth information revolution can be summarized with the 
term	“information	abundance:”	information	that	is	easily	produced	by	virtually	anyone,	
widely distributed, and cheap or free. This radical development in the political economy 
of information and communication associated with the Internet is again changing the 
information ecology, creating new opportunities for adaptation by political organizations. 
The emerging information regime, whose features are not yet fully clear, is one where 
pluralistic expression and aggregation of interests is dominant and is highly accelera-
ted	 compared	 to	 earlier	 times.	 Politics	 happens	 quickly,	 because	 friction	 associated	
with information and communication costs is greatly reduced. Politics is possible with or 
without formal organization, which means that an important feature of democracy in the 
emerging regime is post-bureaucratic pluralism: collective action in conditions of infor-
mation abundance does not necessarily require substantial staff, money, or formalized 
organization.	This	breaks	patterns	of	previous	information	regimes,	and	as	well	violates	
old precepts in social science which are themselves based on observations of old equili-
bria now disrupted.
 In post-bureaucratic pluralism, organizational boundaries are permeable, and infor-
mal	association	and	affiliation	can	replace	formal	membership.	This	entails	old	political	
organizations	doing	 things	 in	new	ways,	and	nominally	organized	groups	or	networks	
accomplishing things previously the exclusive domain of formal organizations. These 
FORO DE DEBATE / DEBATE FORUM • 751 
RIS, VOL. 69. Nº 3, SEPTIEMBRE-DICIEMBRE, 747-781, 2011. ISSN: 0034-9712
changes do not mean that political parties or traditional interest groups will disappear, 
just as each of those survived previous information revolutions. It means instead that the 
organizational landscape for democracy is vastly more complex and no longer adheres 
well to the rules of the previous information regime, with its mass-media based system 
and its formalized system of interest groups, and where the accumulation of resources 
was essentially a prerequisite for political communication.
 Many hopeful observers of the Internet and politics have imagined that among the 
primary consequences of the technological revolution will be an increase in political par-
ticipation	rates.	However,	the	lesson	of	previous	information	revolutions	is	that	the	most	
important effects of changes in the nature of information and communication occur not at 
the individual level but at the organizational one. Information revolutions in the past have 
dramatically affected how interests are organized and how collective action is structured, 
and only secondarily, when at all, have they served to boost individual inclinations toward 
involvement.
 In other words, the connection between information and political organization is direct 
and	tight,	while	the	ties	between	information,	knowledge,	and	behavior	at	the	individual	
level are complex and contingent. So far, this lesson also appears to apply well in the 
case of the Internet, where survey data from 1998 and 2000 shows only the most modest 
of relationships between use of the Internet for political information and such acts as 
voting, donating money, and attending political events. These relationships are too small 
and too vulnerable to endogeneity questions to establish that any important changes are 
yet occurring at this level. It appears, not surprisingly, that the most politically engaged 
people	make	the	most	political	use	of	information	abundance.	The	democratizing	effect	
of	new	technology	in	the	US	arises	not	from	reducing	gaps	in	knowledge	or	participation	
across publics, but by diminishing the relationship between resources and information, 
loosening the dominance of elites on information, and thereby changing who can orga-
nize those publics.
 The latest information revolution in American democracy is of a piece with those 
that came before. Information abundance is leading to another revolution in the middle, 
between the individual and the institutions of the state. The traditional boundaries and 
structures	of	organizations	are	exerting	less	influence	over	who	has	facility	with	political	
information and communication, which in turn affects who can shape policy and organize 
collective action. What may differ from the past is the coherence of the public sphere and 
the predictability of politics, because this latest information revolution is not replacing 
one dominant political intermediary with another; it is creating conditions for a shifting 
competition	over	political	 information	among	a	wide-open	field	of	 contestants	 far	 less	
constrained than at any time in the past. This is not simply a mater of changes due to 
technology	summing	up	to	make	US	politics	better	or	worse	on	the	whole,	or	more	or	less	
participatory,	but	of	 the	evolving	character	of	democratic	 linkages	among	citizens	and	
between them and the state. 
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Rather than gradual transition, evidence suggests that change in some systems follows 
radical disruption in equilibria. Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, for example, see 
such a pattern in evolutionary biology.1		Their	landmark	punctuated	equilibria	model,	first	
introduced in 1972, argues that for most of their geological history, sexually reproducing 
species experience little net evolutionary change. Rapid onset disruptions trigger proces-
ses	leading	to	speciation.		Political	scientists	Bryan	D.	Jones	and	Frank	R.	Baumgartner	
provide a similar explanation for policy processes.  Bursts of rapid and often unpredic-
table policy change punctuate the patterns of relatively long-term policy equilibria.2 For 
example, nuclear energy policy in the United States was profoundly altered by the Three-
Mile Island incident in 1979; just as the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill was a disruption in 
regulation of oceanic transportation of crude.   
 In Information and American Democracy, Bruce Bimber offers a similar argument 
for political mediation.  Mediation involves the means by which members of a public are 
linked	to	broader	 institutional	structures	of	government.	 	The	morphology	of	mediation	
reflects	the	opportunities	and	constraints	associated	with	a	given	period	of	technological	
development.  The four periods of equilibria since the American Revolution have included 
institutional arrangements, newspapers and postal systems, political parties, complex 
bureaucratization associated with the rise of industrial capitalism, mass media, and most 
recently digital information and communication technology.  Bimber calls these periods 
of stasis information regimes	—adaptations	to	“a	particular	ecology	of	 information	and	
communication.”		He	continues,	“A	regime	lasts	until	new	forces	change	the	cost,	distri-
bution,	or	other	characteristics	of	information	in	society.”	These	new	forces	are	referred	
to	as	information	revolutions.		In	short,	stasis	lasts	until	a	break	or	punctuation	ushers	in	
a new period of equilibria built around new adaptations.  
 1 Stephen	Jay	Gould	and	Niles	Eldredge,	“Punctuated	Equilibria:	an	Alternative	to	Phyletic	Gradualism,”	
in T.J.M. Schopf, ed., Models in Paleobiology, (San Francisco: Freeman Cooper), pp. 82-115. Also reprinted 
in N. Eldredge Time frames, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985). See also Stephen Jay Gould and Niles 
Eldredge,	“Punctuated	Equilibria:	the	Tempo	and	Mode	of	Evolution	Reconsidered,”	Paleobiology 3 (2), 1977, 
pp. 115-151.
 2 Bryan	D.	 Jones	and	Frank	R.	Baumgartner, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993.
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 Modeling the effects of technology on political processes in this way lifts the burden 
of	a	Sisyphean	effort	of	keeping	up	with	the	latest	technology	in	an	effort	to	understand	
governance and information.  It draws our attention instead to information regimes — 
the broad technological conditions that give rise to particular political opportunities and 
constraints.  In addition to parsimony, Bimber’s approach pushes the analysis toward 
more grounded theoretical contexts such as organizational theory, economics, and (in 
the	current	fourth	information	regime)	complexity	theory	and	network	theory.		It	opens	up	
a	remarkably	robust	and	rich	research	agenda.		That	is	why	his	argument	has	continued	
to inspire new research, even after almost a decade of new technological and political 
developments.		The	remainder	of	my	remarks	center	on	several	of	the	research	foci	that	
emerge	from	Bimber’s	work.
 One of these additional layers of analysis inspired by Information and American 
Democracy involves the scope and scale of collective action.  Bimber wants to explain 
the	effects	of	technology	on	the	nature	of	mediation	over	time	in	the	United	States.		His	
focus	 is	on	 longitudinal	change	in	a	fixed	geopolitical	sphere.	Approached	in	this	way,	
Bimber is able to specify the effects of technology over time while holding constant other 
factors such as culture and constitutive institutional structures.  To use an analogy from 
paleobiology, attention is focused on changes in one species over time.  This offers 
powerful explanatory possibilities, as Bimber demonstrates.  
 Yet it is important to recognize the tradeoffs found in this approach.  For example, 
approaching	information	and	politics	in	this	way	makes	it	more	difficult	to	see	the	effects	
of technological diffusion across borders at a single point in time.  A cross-sectional 
approach	yields	quite	different	observations.	Network	scalability	across	borders	 in	 the	
fourth information regime, for instance, is accentuated when we relax the focus on a 
bounded geographical area.  Rather than regime, a better metaphor here is shifting conti-
guous	ecologies,	shape	shifting	over	time	in	response	to	“species	invasions”	from	neigh-
boring information ecologies.  This is of course the metaphor used by Pierre Levy, whom 
Bimber credits with inspiring some parts of his argument about information and politics. 
 If one imagines contiguous zones of varying levels of opportunity and constraint pro-
duced according to variation in the diffusion of technological and organizational adap-
tation,	one	sees	patterns	of	contrasting	mediation	 that	 look	much	more	 like	a	map	of	
contrasting ecosystems that cut across state borders.  Whereas an information regime is 
a	more	or	less	linear	progression	over	time	in	a	specified	geographical	space,	information	
ecologies	are	contested	fluid	spaces	across	state	boundaries	and	across	time.		These	
patterns are reticulated and uneven, expanding and contracting according to system 
dynamics.	Indeed,	one	of	the	defining	elements	of	post-bureaucratic	politics	is	that	elec-
tronically	enabled	networks	create	scalability	from	local	to	global	significance	regardless	
of the preference of intermediating hierarchical institutions.  International newsgathering 
offers an initial example.
 The history of satellite newsgathering	 is	marked	by	a	steady	progression	 in	uplink	
versatility and mobility.  What once required tons of equipment operated by a platoon 
of	field	engineers	is	now	reduced	to,	in	the	extreme,	the	use	of	a	device	that	fits	in	the	
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overhead luggage compartment on commercial aircraft. This allows for the temporary 
insertion of high-tech functionality in an otherwise low functionality information ecosys-
tem.  It is rather analogous to a viral vector.  When a television news crew shows up with 
a	satellite	uplink	unit	to	broadcast	live	from	a	remote	war	zone,	famine,	or	natural	disas-
ter, in that space and time the opportunities and constraints for mediation are altered, 
both locally and globally.  Local events are scalable to a global audience, including policy 
makers.	This	is	the	basis	for	the	so-called	CNN	effect,	a	term	that	needs	to	be	updated	
to	take	 into	consideration	the	plethora	of	other	 instantaneous	global	 technologies	now	
available.  Furthermore, advanced Western militaries insert a much greater set of tech-
nological capacities, though usually for very different objectives. Lifting the fog of war and 
creating situational awareness involves the deployment of advanced tools of information 
collection and distribution, capabilities usually paired with weapons systems. Despite 
its narrow application, this example underscores that, when viewed comparatively, con-
temporary information technologies are no longer containable within state boundaries. 
Indeed,	as	Manuel	Castells	has	forcefully	argued,	information	flows	across	electronically	
enabled	networks	are	corrosive	to	state	borders.	
 Rather than an invading army of technologies, sometimes literally, information 
ecosystems more often evolve from within systems but are catalyzed from without.  The 
proliferation of 5.3 billion mobile phones is perhaps the best example of this evolutionary 
change over time with cross-border diffusion of disruptive technology.  As with an ecosys-
tem,	when	invading	species	take	advantage	of	changes	in	conditions,	the	boundaries	of	
opportunity and constraint created by these systems tend to ignore boundaries of the 
state.  Voice-over-Internet Protocol and even simple mobile roaming agreements cut 
across	the	globe	with	nominal	costs	to	users.	Members	of	global	diaspora	are	linked	with	
home in both sentimental and practical ways. For instance, sons and daughters in Paris, 
London	or	New	York	pay	the	utility	bills	of	parents	in	Africa	by	transferring	credits	using	
M-Pesa	and	other	mobile	 banking	 services.	Meanwhile,	 farmers	 in	 remote	 regions	of	
Africa	get	the	daily	commodity	price	reports	via	text	messaging	about	price	fluctuations	at	
exchanges	in	London,	New	York,	and	Shanghai.	The	point	is,	from	a	global	perspective,	
technologies	create	fluid	and	nonlinear	progressions	of	political	and	economic	mediation	
that	are	not	necessarily	confined	to	the	borders	of	the	nation	state.	This	opens	up	the	
possibility that political opportunities and constraints to collective action are produced 
by exogenous technological developments, as well as by the sort of indigenous effects 
highlighted in Bimber’s examples. Secondly, post-bureaucratic politics has important 
implications for not only the nature of mediation within a state, but also for the nature of 
the state system of global governance. 
 Technologies facilitate a deeper capacity for nonstate actors to gather information 
independently of the state. One example of this is the development of high-resolution 
remote sensing satellites. In 1999 a private company called Space Imaging (now GeoEye) 
launched	the	Ikonos	remote	sensing	satellite.	Once	operational	in	January	2000,	Ikonos	
ushered in a new capacity technical analysis from space. A nongovernmental organiza-
tion in Washington called the Institute for Science and International Security used com-
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mercial remote sensing data to reveal the Iranian nuclear program.3		Hundreds	of	millions	
of	square	kilometers	of	the	earth’s	terrain	is	now	captured	by	a	fleet	of	high-resolution	
remote sensing satellites. Objects on the ground well under a half-meter are visible from 
400	miles	 in	 space.	This	 empowers	 electronically	 enabled	 networks	 of	 scientists	 and	
activists around the globe to monitor weapons proliferation, environmental effects such 
as	deforestation,	desertification,	and	other	visible	effects.		Multispectral	and	hyperspec-
tral imaging allows scientists and advocates to monitor even the chemical composition of 
objects on the ground and the health of plants and ecosystems.  
	 Just	as	significant	are	the	many	derivative	capabilities	from	several	nested	technolo-
gies.		High-resolution	remote	sensing	data	allows	for	the	precise	mapping	of	the	planet.	
Georectification	is	the	process	of	matching	image	data	to	a	set	of	geographical	coordi-
nates so that each pixel of the image is assigned a geographical coordinate.  It is this 
process that leads to the use of precise mapping tools such as Google Maps.  Because 
mobile phone masts are arrayed according to GIS coordinates, the position of a phone 
can	be	situated	in	a	geospatial	field.	Some	devices	are	located	by	triangulation	directly	
with geographical positioning satellites. These are a few of the elements to an emerging 
area of electronically enabled collective action called crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing in 
turn	involves	the	distribution	of	small	discrete	tasks	to	volunteers	across	a	network.	One	
particular type of crowdsourcing is called event mapping, and sometimes crisis mapping. 
It enlists thousands of volunteers to contribute information using any number of means of 
communication.  Perhaps most important is the use of mobile phones in crisis mapping. 
Ushahidi is an event mapping or crowdsourcing platform that emerged in the midst of 
the post-election violence in Kenya in 2008.  Over 45,000 discrete pieces of information 
were geotagged (situated on a digital map) and posted online.  Since then, Ushahidi has 
been deployed over 15,000 times, most notably as an information gathering and relief 
and	aid	coordination	platform	during	the	wildfires	in	Russia	in	2010	and	the	earthquake	
in	Haiti	 in	2010.	In	these	and	other	 instances,	Ushahidi	 facilitated	coordination	of	self-
organizing systems of aid. Word of needed assistance, available resources, and required 
distribution systems appeared as geotagged locations on evolving digital maps. This 
offers examples of scalable coordination without the direct involvement of institutions of 
the state.  
	 As	 noted	earlier,	Bimber’s	 focus	 on	 information	 regimes	—rather	 than	on	 specific	
technologies— offers clear advantages. Doing so offers parsimony and powerful ave-
nues of analysis across several disciplines. Yet if we relax this for a moment and consider 
the possibility that different categories of technology accentuate relative advantages and 
 3 Steven Livingston and Sean Aday, 	“Taking	the	State	Out	of	State--Media	Relations	Theory:	How	Trans-
national	Advocacy	Networks	are	Changing	the	Press	--State	Dynamic,	Media,	War	&	Conflict	2008	1:	99.	pp.	
99-107;	NGOs	as	 intelligence	agencies:	The	Empowerment	 of	Transnational	Advocacy	Networks	and	 the	
Media by Commercial Remote Sensing in the Case of the Iranian Nuclear Program, Geoforum, Vol. 40, Issue 
4, July 2009, pp. 514-522
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disadvantages for collective action, we can see important variation in the relative costs 
and	benefits	according	 to	classes	of	 technology.	A	 full	exploration	of	 this	possibility	 is	
beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	response	to	Bimber’s	important	book,	so	I	will	limit	my	
remarks	to	a	few	suggestions.
Information	 communication	 is	 only	 half	 of	 the	 benefit	 associated	with	 the	 information	
technologies	that	define	the	fourth	information	regime.		Just	as	important	are	the	tech-
nologies that facilitate the collection of information by nonstate actors across geopolitical 
boundaries. This can be something as simple, yet at times profound as a video captu-
red by one of the 5.3 billion mobile phones found around the planet in 2011. Or it can 
be as sophisticated as satellite image analysis by independent scientists and analysts 
looking	 for	signs	of	nuclear	weapons	proliferation,	ecological	damage	and	change,	or	
even human rights abuses. The movement of displaced persons to new camps can be 
tracked	from	space.	My	point	is	that	information-gathering	capabilities	define	particular	
information ecologies. Political opportunities are created by a new abundance of informa-
tion gathering as they are from information sharing. Photogrammetry by nonstate actors 
and event mapping by crowdsourcing are important to collective action for their power to 
generate information.
 Bruce Bimber’s Information and American Democracy is	one	of	a	handful	of	books	
that	opened	the	door	to	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	mediation	and	information.		Rather	
than loosing its power and analytical acumen over time, it has actually become a spring-
board	for	thinking	about	new	questions.		
internet, new forms of Power and democracy
José luís gaRcia
Instituto de Ciências Sociais. Universidade de Lisboa. Portugal.
Against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	 technological	 revolution	 of	 the	 Internet,	 Bruce	 Bimber’s	
reflection	questions	the	relation	between	the	changes	in	information	in	society	and	forms	
of power and democratic practice. Bimber has no doubts that contemporary  technology 
influences	change	in	the	organization	of	political	interests,	collective	action	and	possibly	
levels	of	political	commitment.	His	questioning	 is	extremely	pertinent:	we	are	no	more	
than at the beginning of understanding the enormous implications of the Net and the 
information revolution in the political sphere (as well as in other innumerable aspects of 
our individual and collective lives). Although there is already a great deal of research, 
there is still much more to be done, both theoretically and empirically. And it should be 
noted that it is necessary to overcome many obstacles to reinvigorate research ideas 
and	paths	on	the	Internet	in	general,	and	very	specifically	on	the	historical	and	political	
sens	of	the	digital	technological	environment	in	which	we	are	fast	being	“plunged”	—the	
liquid	and	fluid	metaphors	are	a	defining	characteristic	of	our	times—	since	the	end	of	the	
twentieth century.  I will return to this topic to conclude my comment. 
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	 Building	 from	a	historical	viewpoint	 to	provide	a	broad	sketch	holding	 the	USA	
as	an	analytical	framework,	Bimber	argues	that	the	Internet	is	the	fourth	information	
revolution.	The	first,	which	took	place	in	1820-30	and	had	lasting	consequences	until	
1880-1910, led to major developments such as the propagation of the Penny Press 
and the creation of a postal service that allowed the movement of information across 
the country. The postal service and the press had a foundational role in the creation 
of a political communication system of major importance in enhancing political iden-
tity and voting numbers. This system was pivotal to allow the dominance of political 
parties	 as	 key	 political	 intermediaries	 in	 the	USA.	The	 second	 revolution	 concer-
ned not the capacity to distribute information in a coordinated manner at a national 
scale, but of its complexity and specialization. Industrialization and urbanization led 
to an explosion in specialized information which created political complexity and 
gave birth to a new intermediary, overthrowing the parties in their ability to con-
trol information. This new intermediary was the organized interest group, formed by 
information specialists dedicated to lobbying for their particular claim in politics. After 
the	mid-twentieth	century,	a	third	revolutionary	change	in	information	took	place	with	
an increase in broadcasting, prompting mass audiences on a national scale. This 
technologically-enabled transformation created new, very centralized political struc-
tures, and a different system for funding political communication which was adapted 
to explore changes in the character of information and communication.
		 It	 becomes	 apparent	 that	 Bimber	 takes	 into	 consideration	 the	 role	 played	 by	
technology, including in his reflection the influence of the technological revolution 
steered by the Internet. Such an approach escapes the trend of most sociological 
and communication studies, preferring to contextualize the media with social forces 
and institutions, more than with technologies. This perspective indicates that Bimber 
does not fear being accused of technological determinism, one of the most abusive 
and accusatory expressions in social sciences academia of our time. It is obvious 
that Bimber does not believe that technological determinism is a law ruling human 
society, here recalling the notion of technological determinism which he called 
“nomological”	in	the	article	“Karl	Marx	and	the	three	faces	of	technological	determi-
nism”	already	two	decades	ago.	Still,	Bimber’s	thesis	tends	towards	assigning	impor-
tance to the nexus between technical dynamism in information, comprehending new 
media,	computer	 technical	systems,	 information	networks,	new	platforms,	and	 the	
structure of political intermediaries. The idea underlying his perspective is entirely 
relevant: a technology is an agent of change in informational ecology and alterations 
in the latter lead to modifications in political intermediation. 
 In coherence with his thesis, Bimber argues that the transformation impelled 
by the Internet —the fourth information revolution— promotes a new information 
ecology,	characterized		by	“information	abundance”	(a	concept	evoking	“communica-
tional	opulence”	by	Abraham	Moles),	which	is	at	the	origin	of	a	new	regime	he	calls	
“postbureaucratic	pluralism”.	 Information	 is	easily	produced	by	anyone,	as	well	as	
widely distributed and cheap or free. The pluralistic expression and the combination 
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of	 interests	becomes	dominant,	politics	 takes	place	 in	an	accelerated	 fashion	and	
is possible with or without formal organization. Under information abundance con-
ditions, collective action may forego a numerous body of staff, money or formalized 
organization. Bimber states it would be wrong to expect from this new regime the 
disappearance	of	traditional	interest	groups	and	political	parties.	He	also	rejects	the	
optimistic view that this new situation leads to an increase in political participation 
indexes. This results from the fact that the most relevant effect from changes in the 
nature of information and communication under the influence of information revolu-
tions	takes	place	not	on	an	individual,	but	on	an	organizational	 level.	According	to	
Bimber,	the	fourth	revolution	does	not	reduce	the	divide	in	knowledge	or	participation	
among publics, but does affect the relationship between resources and information, 
weakening	the	predominance	of	elites	in	information	and	changing	the	organizers	of	
these	publics.	With	the	Internet	revolution,	what	is	at	stake	is	the	evolutive	character	
of the democratic connections between citizens and between citizens and the state, 
instead of technological transformations that lead to greater or lesser participation. 
Bimber’s conclusion is undoubtedly very insightful. Only dreamers can believe there 
are technical solutions to political motivation and participation. Not all technical pos-
sibilities turn into social realities and the directions of change depend heavily on the 
distribution of power and resources. Studying the influence of the Internet shows 
how relevant it is to the level of multiplication of information sources, the weathering 
of the monopoly of media companies, and new discussion instruments. Neverthe-
less, it also implies problems regarding information reliability, new social limits (the 
digital divide) and, in particular, the transformation of the public sphere. 
 In this comment to Bimber’s viewpoint, it seems worth mentioning that one should 
take	into	account	a	more	profound	definition	of	the	differences	among	media	techno-
logies (I say media since they are more widely in question in technological informa-
tion	revolutions	which	are	historically	mentioned)	and	a	closer	look	at	the	sources	of	
the optimistic thesis. To better understand the reach of Bimber’s argument and other 
issues concerning the relation between information technologies, political communi-
cation and democracy, it is necessary to linger a bit more on these two topics. In fact, 
it is easy to define the media only superficially and any approach to them affects the 
respective	reflection.	The	media	are	often	placed	under	a	generic	notion	and	taken	
by utopian visions. If it is erroneous to have an instrumental notion of technologies 
making	them	mere	means	whose	consequences	depend	on	how	they	will	be	used,	it	
is	also	risky	to	talk	about	technology	in	the	singular	while	analyzing	the	influence	of	
a specific technological medium. 
 The media integrate technology, but it is technologies that hold the singularity 
of acting on communicational realities generating symbols, meanings and culture, 
through text, image and sound. Symbols, meanings and culture are maintained and 
modified not only by institutions and social relations, but also by technical means. 
Symbols, metaphors, allegories, concepts, culture appear today largely incorporated 
in different media and information technologies giving them existence and origina-
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ting social relations that actualize them. Communication cannot be understood as 
mere fluxes of information, messages, or content between sender and receiver. In 
each communicational practice conceptions of the real, forms of expression and 
social relations are triggered. All technology is part of culture in several senses, but 
the	media	and	new	information	technologies	are	intrinsically	“means	to	think	with”.	
More than tools with which we act, they are powerful means through which reality 
is	 largely	 defined.	Therefore,	what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 current	
communication revolution and the political sphere are not just established ideas of 
politics and democracy, but the very redefinition of what is politics and democracy. 
The question of the evolutive character of democratic connections between citizens 
and between citizens and the state mentioned by Bimber should be seen in all this 
scope in regard to the implications of new media and information technologies. The 
new information technologies introduce other forms of political language and political 
thought, promote the recomposition of battle and alliance fields, and allow the emer-
gence of new groups and forms of domination and authority. More important still: 
they stimulate the proliferation of indirect relations, in which not only citizens act, but 
also	organizations,	powerful	institutions	and	markets.	
 Information technologies occupy a privileged position in our cultural horizon. 
They are part of the rhetoric with which we celebrate each introduction of a new 
technology under the old idea built in the modern West that we fabricate instruments 
to	 enjoy	 their	 benefits.	 Technologies	 linked	 with	 information	 and	 communication	
are seen as forces against isolation and disconnection between humans, allies of 
knowledge	and	enlightenment	as	sources	of	access	to	reality.	The	enthusiasm	with	
which	these	technologies	are	greeted	leads	us	to	mistakenly	believe	that	technical	
change	 holds	 the	 key	 to	 solving	 cultural,	 political	 and	 social	 problems.	 It	 forgets	
that more information is not better information, that information is not the same as 
knowledge,	and	that	democracy	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	production	and	dissemi-
nation of more information. The inclusion of new information technologies in the 
language of myth, which also happens with the economic and political means that 
promote them, is a serious obstacle to a rigorous sociological analysis. We need 
more	 theoretical	 work	 and	 research	 on	 the	 Internet	 and	 its	 ambiguous	 influence	
on all areas of social life. It is not enough to state that the Internet constituted an 
impressive increase in information in several domains and brought new forms of 
exchange and discussion. Theory and research still need to explore a wide field of 
study encompassing the Internet and new forms of power wielded at a distance, the 
Internet and the implementation of new forms of commerce and the abstraction of 
money and commodities, the growth of entertainment and, in the strict political field, 
the Internet and the compartmentalization of the public sphere. 
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internet: a technological tool and changes in Political Power
liu gang
Institute of Philosophy. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. China.
Professor Bruce Bimber gives us a sound description between technology and political 
power in his Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Poli-
tical Power.	 It	 is	an	 interesting	topic	and	as	the	subtitle	of	 the	book	shows,	he	 is	very	
much concerned with the evolution of technology. Evolution is a big word that could be 
employed	in	any	situation.	Bimber,	however,	confined	this	big	word	to	a	small	area	in	the	
world and in an even narrower manner to political power. 
 America is a young country with advanced technology, especially Internet, which is 
so popular at present. Bimber’s interests also focus on the new technology with what he 
called post-bureaucratic pluralism during the information age with its pervasive compu-
ting. Actually, politics has to be adapted to changing technology, that is to say, bureau-
cracy	should	have	an	alternative	form	with	respect	to	previous	ones.	In	this	book,	Bimber	
provides	a	historical	framework	of	the	four	political	information	revolutions	from	the	“very	
birth	of	the	American	Constitution”	to	the	“technological	revolution	driven	by	the	Internet”	
in the United States. And different conventions have their own ways of spreading infor-
mation, hence political powers have to use these means for their own convenience to 
achieve their political endeavors.
 The author argues that political organizations and structures in the United States 
have adapted over time to the changing opportunities and constraints for managing poli-
tical information and communication. These changes in the cost and distribution of com-
munication and information have not occurred continuously, but have gone through long 
periods of stability punctuated by rather rapid moments of transformation arising from 
technological developments or changes in the economic and institutional complexity of 
society.	 These	 information	 revolutions	 advantaged	 certain	 kinds	 of	 organizations	 and	
structures	over	others	in	the	political	marketplace,	leading	to	adaptation	in	the	world	of	
politics.
 These were not changes in the structure of state institutions, though they have clearly 
evolved over more than two centuries. Changes associated with information revolutions 
have	been	concentrated	in	the	domain	of	the	linkage	organizations	and	intermediaries	
that connect individuals in a sometimes rapidly changing society to the more slowly 
evolving structures of the state. The rise of the Internet and the adaptation of political 
organizations to changing circumstances in the 1990s and 2000s produced the fourth 
information regime in the US, which is characterized by abundance in information and 
communication,	and	which	has	weakened	relationships	between	the	distribution	of	mate-
rial	resources	and	the	ability	to	organize	certain	kinds	of	political	action.
	 Transforming	matter	 into	material	 is	 certainly	 a	 social	 process.	 However,	 nobody	
would assert that it is fully controlled by society, even less so when material is combined 
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to form complex artifacts and systems. Technology is not a conscious subject; it is not an 
independent object by itself. It forms visible and often frightening environments, which 
are enabling and forbidding at the same time. Observations such as are the foundation of 
the	dilemma	of	technological	determinism:	Is	society	the	High	Priest	or	the	apprentice?	
Or are both residents within society? Is there agency in technology or only behind it?
 Nonetheless, Bimber is optimistic about the post-bureaucratic pluralism or informa-
tion regime. Especially, he concluded that the information revolution will be in the middle. 
A	well	informed	citizenry	is	a	“well-established	tenet	of	American	popular	culture.”	Good	
citizenship as the core value can be much better attained in the information revolution, 
and	[…]	“up	through	the	rise	of	contemporary	in	information	technology	raises	questions	
about	 this	 ideal	 of	 informed	 citizenship.”	What	 questions?	Bimber	 puts	 out	 a	 few,	 for	
example, if the evolution of media and the changing characteristics of information across 
time lead to changes in the nature of political intermediaries, what about levels of citizen 
engagement? Is the rise of information abundance and new post-bureaucratic structures 
for	 collective	 action	 in	 the	 contemporary	 period	 linked	 to	 the	 broader	 engagement	 in	
politics? 
	 In	the	Preface	to	the	Chinese	edition	of	his	book,	Bimber	observed	that two important 
developments	have	occurred	since	the	book	was	written.	In	the	world	of	technology	and	
politics	 itself,	a	new	generation	of	 Internet	 tools	 that	 rapidly	came	 to	be	called	 “social	
media”	appeared.	Beginning	in	2003	and	2004,	new	ways	of	employing	the	Internet	and	
cellular telephony gave primacy to people’s ability to create and distribute their own mes-
sages, images, and other content, and to organize their communication and sharing of 
information	around	social	 networks	—their	 own	networks,	 the	networks	of	 the	people	
within	their	networks,	and	networks	further	removed.	A	key	feature	of	this	development	
for	politics	 is	 that	boundaries	have	broken	down	between	 these	 layers	of	networks	of	
individual citizens on the one hand, and on the other hand the mass media and political 
organizations. This phenomenon has been global in scale, and through social networ-
king	tools	has	touched	politics	in	other	countries.	In	the	US,	these	collapsing	boundaries	
between	citizens	in	their	social	networks	and	formal	political	organizations	have	thus	far	
reached	their	peak	during	Barack	Obama’s	successful	presidential	campaign	in	2008—	a	
campaign that featured the intensive and adept use of technologies that had not existed 
even	a	few	years	before.	In	the	midst	of	the	present	 information	revolution,	five	or	ten	
years is a very long time. 
 The second development involves advances in research on media and politics. In 
the	world	of	academic	research,	five	or	even	ten	years	is	not	such	a	long	time,	though	
there	has	been	much	new	work	on	digital	media	and	politics.	 In	 the	US	context,	 and	
also to some extent in Europe, Asia and other places of the world, a question of central 
fascination for many people has been whether or not the Internet would precipitate an 
increase	in	various	kinds	of	democratic	participation.	Those	findings	have	been	interpre-
ted variously as evidence for and against an effect on participation from Internet use. It is 
now much clearer that a small positive association does exist between Internet use and 
participation in some cases, and this can not be explained away as an artifact of political 
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interest.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 effect	 is	 concentrated	 among	 younger	 generations,	 and	 it	
appears increasingly clear that interest in public affairs and other motivational charac-
teristics interact with the use of digital media —something that was not explored in this 
book.
	 Beyond	the	lingering	question	of	participation	rates,	the	larger	argument	in	this	book	
was that the real action in politics and technology in the US lies in changing political 
structures for engagement and in new ways of organizing, not in how many people do or 
do not engage. Bimber believes that most of that argument is holding up well. The social 
media revolution has done nothing if not accelerate those processes of information revo-
lution. New structures of political association appear and fade away through social media 
tools,	often	focused	on	specific	events	such	as	protests	or	political	decisions.	At	the	same	
time, long-standing formal organizations are adapting and exploring new strategies. 
 It is said the number of the Internet users in China is the largest in the world. So far as 
the question of democracy is concerned, it is always a sensitive topic because of the wide 
and instant spreading of information across the Internet. And the consequence might be 
drastic in a country with such a large population. In contrast to the information regime, 
China is trying to adopt a deliberative democracy in order not to trigger the problem as 
Bimber observed with regard to the Million Mother March, etc. 
	 Public	forums	break	through	the	limits	of	time	and	space	resulting	in	direct	and	indi-
rect communication for citizens to negotiate with the traditional bureaucratic officers, for-
cing them to encounter the questions in real society, which were often concealed due to 
the bureaucracy system. Politics is regarded as a topic within the government as it were, 
with the rise of the Internet in China, discussion and engagement beyond the govern-
ment has come into being. In pluralistic environments many common topics in relation to 
politics and policies are being debated and communicated. This, in my opinion, provides 
momentum for the evolution of the political structure on the one hand, and on the other, 
it dissolves the unstable factors during the process of modernization and stimulates the 
democratic	consciousness	of	citizens.	However,	we	have	to	admit	there	is	still	a	long	way	
ahead in a country that has experienced such an accelerated social transformation in the 
last	10	years.	Bimber’s	book	is	an	outstanding	mirror	for	Chinese	scholars	in	which	we	can	
see that the new technology will sooner or later change the political scenario of China.
information and american democracy in the era of web 2.0
loRenzo Mosca 
Communication and Entertainment Department. Università Roma Tre. Italy.
Bruce	Bimber’s	book	was	published	in	2003	at	the	beginning	of	what	he	calls	“the	fourth	
information	revolution.”	Even	if	the	book	was	written	almost	a	decade	ago,	it	is	still	extre-
mely intriguing and challenging.
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	 This	work	displays	a	deep	knowledge	of	the	lessons	of	sociology,	political	science,	
economics, political psychology, and political thought as well as the ability to use different 
research techniques (quantitative and qualitative).
	 The	overall	importance	of	this	book	clearly	lies	in	moving	the	emphasis	toward	the	
nexus between characteristics of political information and properties of democratic power 
and	practice,	filling	a	gap	patently	present	in	the	literature.	As	the	author	states	“To	argue	
that some very important features of American democracy have roots in informational 
phenomena	 is	not	 to	 suggest	 that	other	 factors	have	been	unimportant	 in	 influencing	
change […] Rather than suggesting that these factors be set aside […], I claim that 
information	phenomena	must	be	added	to	the	picture	for	a	complete	account”	(ibidem: 
20).	The	“informational	perspective”	embraced	by	Bimber	places	information	and	com-
munication at the core of political analysis as independent variables. This methodological 
choice aims at overcoming the limits of previous research which tend to devote scant 
attention to such a dimension of analysis, often quoted by many others but rarely discus-
sed and investigated adequately.
	 Another	 important	methodological	wariness	 in	Bimber’s	work	 concerns	online	and	
offline	 interplay.	As	 he	 correctly	 observes	 “it	makes	more	 sense	 to	 speak	 of	 a	 single	
‘world’ with on-line and off-line features than attempting to maintain a distinction between 
an on-line world and an off-line world, categories which are largely artifacts of historical 
transition”	(ibidem: 9). This caution is part of an holistic approach which focuses on gene-
ral processes rather than on particular episodes.
	 Given	 the	 year	 in	which	 it	was	 published,	 the	 book	 does	 not	 consider	 or	 discuss	
the	implications	of	web	2.0	on	information	flows	and	on	American	democracy.	Actually,	
the latest stage in the evolution of the web could be seen just as a peculiar type of 
“tree”	within	a	“forest”	of	technological	innovations.	As	the	author	rightly	notes,	“Instead	
of	attending	closely	to	technological	matters	and	details	of	this	kind,	I	concentrate	on	the	
broad sweep of technological development. In particular, I focus on the fact that various 
contemporary technologies are in many different ways creating a more information-rich 
and communication-intensive society and polity. […] Understanding the consequences 
and historical context for media abundance is more important here than drawing connec-
tions between any particular technology and political outcome. Focusing on the forest 
rather than the trees has an important advantage. From a technological perspective, it 
avoids	the	consequences	of	dwelling	on	specific	technologies	that	are	subject	to	frequent	
change	or	obsolescence.”(2003:	28,	emphasis	added).	While	Bimber’s	methodological	
choice	is	definitely	correct,	the	shift	towards	“participatory	web”	is	probably	worth	a	spe-
cific	discussion	and	a	second	edition	of	the	book	should	certainly	include	some	reflection	
on this technological change. In fact, according to the author, the main characteristic of 
the	fourth	information	revolution	lies	in	“information	abundance”	and	in	the	rise	of	“post-
bureaucratic	organizations”.	In	this	sense	the	digital	revolution	entails	notable	differen-
ces between the individual and organizational level. As Bimber claims, this revolution 
“suggest[s]	a	set	of	 important	changes	 that	are	concentrated	between	the	 level	of	 the	
mass	public	and	institutions	of	the	state	itself	—a	revolution	in	the	middle”	(ibidem: 229). 
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In other words, as observed for previous information regimes, the greatest transforma-
tions brought about by the fourth wave of change in information and communication 
affects the meso level more than the micro one. This means that the amount of mate-
rial or human resources needed to organize collective actions dramatically decreases. 
Organizational boundaries become more permeable and the relationship with mem-
bers less demanding. These changes imply a transition from interest groups to issue 
groups, up to event groups: in the new information regime political action tends to be 
organized	around	specific	events.	
 Information revolutions then have to be understood as changes in the identity and 
structure	of	political	intermediaries:	from	parties	(that	emerged	thanks	to	the	creation	
of a national postal service and the press) to interest groups (which rose during a 
phase of industrialization and urbanization), from candidate campaign organizations 
(facilitated by broadcasting) to post-bureaucratic political groups (typical of the Inter-
net era).
 Web 2.0 adds the multiplication of information producers to this shift in intermedia-
tion. Prosumers4 are an emergent subject in an information regime characterized by 
user-generated content. As Bimber already noted, such changes do not dramatically 
alter	the	way	information	regimes	work	as	traditional	 institutional	actors	either	resist	
or	adapt	 to	 technological	 innovation,	but	do	not	disappear.	However,	 the	complexity	
of the social system and political processes is further exacerbated. Moreover, social 
networks	could	make	what	is	a	revolution	from	the	middle	into	a	revolution	from	the	
bottom. Web 2.0 platforms are in fact further disintermediating citizens from political 
organizations by providing resources to organize collective action beyond traditional 
actors.
	 While	the	data	presented	in	Bimber’s	book	clearly	show	that	the	individual	level	is	
almost	unaffected	by	 the	 information	revolution	as	only	 the	“usual	suspects”	benefit	
from it while the information-poor stay poor, recent surveys highlight that the Inter-
net has become the second most popular source of information after TV, surpassing 
newspapers and radio in popularity as a news platform.5 Does this change have some 
implications for political participation and civic engagement at the individual level? 
Or as noted by some scholars6	 the	“colonization”	and	“normalization”	of	cyberspace	
makes	online	gatekeepers	(i.e.	search	engines)	resemble	the	power	dynamics	of	usual	
politics?	Is	the	possibility	disclosed	by	social	networks	to	create,	modify	and	distribute	
information	among	like-minded	and	trusted	people	going	to	have	any	consequences	
 4 Toffler,	A.	(1980),	The third wave: The classic study of tomorrow,	New	York:	Morrow.
 5 http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Online-News/Summary-of-Findings.aspx?r=1
 6 Hindman,	M.	(2009),	The myth of digital democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Koopmans 
R.,	Zimmermann,	A.	(2010),	“Transnational	Political	Communication	on	the	Internet:	Search	Engine	Results	
and	Hyperlink	Networks”,	in	R.	Koopmans	and	P.	Statham	(eds.),	The Making of a European Public Sphere. 
Media Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 171-194.
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for	“communications	ecology”?	While	Bimber	stresses	how	previous	research	founds	
a	null	effect	of	greater	information	flows	on	political	participation	at	the	individual	level,	
empirical evidence coming from different countries (i.e. the Spanish mobilization of 
2004	against	 terrorist	attacks	 in	Madrid7,	 the	 “Green	Revolution“in	 Iran	 in	2009,	 the	
social unrest in the Arab world in 2010 and 2011) seems to signal how digital techno-
logies	 facilitate	what	Clay	Shirky8	 refers	 to	as	“organizing	without	organizations”	 (or	
organizationless organizing), which means moving one step beyond post-bureaucratic 
organizations. While this opportunity certainly gives individuals a larger degree of free-
dom	 for	 political	 action,	 it	 could	 also	 trigger	 what	 Freeman	 called	 “The	Tyranny of 
Structurelessness”9, which occurs when organizationless hides power asymmetries 
and de facto	leadership,	thus	making	organizational	dynamics	opaque	and	unrespon-
sive.
	 The	hypothesis	of	“organizing	without	organizations”	is	challenged	by	the	concept	
of	 “organizational	 hybridity”.10 This refers to the convergence of previously distinct 
organizational repertoires typically associated with political parties, interest groups, 
and social movements encouraged by the Internet. Thus, the fourth information revo-
lution does not witness the emergence of new political intermediaries supplanting pre-
vious ones, but the hybridization of organizational forms which borrow and mix forms 
of action typical of different organizational types. Are we then experiencing a transition 
towards organizationless organizing, organizational hybridity or are both trends pre-
sent at the same time?
	 Another	point	worth	discussing	concerns	the	relevance	of	Bimber’s	work	beyond	
the	United	States;	an	 issue	which	 is	 tackled	 in	 the	conclusion	of	his	book.	Can	 the	
theoretical	framework	proposed	by	Bimber	be	applied	to	other	Western	democracies	
and beyond? The author partially answers this question by addressing the consequen-
ces	of	the	“global”	information	revolution	beyond	the	US.	But	what	about	information	
regimes and their changes across time and space? Obviously, the analysis of different 
information regimes proposed by the American scholar is strictly related to the history 
of	his	country.	The	characteristics	of	the	first	information	revolution	cannot	be	easily	
found	and	translated	into	different	contexts.	Nonetheless,	the	first	revolution	probably	
occurred in other national contexts coinciding with democratization processes and 
the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere. As for the later information revolutions 
(industrialization, broadcasting, internet diffusion), these can be detected —though 
at a different pace and with different characteristics— in most Western democracies. 
 7 V Sampedro Blanco, V.F. (ed.) (2005), 13-M: Multitudes online, Madrid: Libros de la Catarata.
 8 Shirky,	C.	(2008),	Here	comes	everybody:	The	power	of	organizing	without	organizations,	New	York:	
Penguin Press.
 9 Freeman,	J.	(1973),	1973.	“The	Tyranny	of	Structurelessness”,	in	A.	Koedt,	E.	Levine	and	A.	Rapone	
(eds), Radical Feminism, New	York:	Quadrangle	Books,	pp.	285-299.
 10 Chadwick,	A.	(2007)	“Digital	Network	Repertoires	and	Organizational	Hybridity”,	Political Communica-
tion, 24 (3), pp. 283-301.
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Bimber’s	 book	 pushes	 us	 to	 apply	 the	 same	 reasoning	 to	 those	 countries	 that	 did	
not	 experience	 the	 two	 first	 revolutions	 (democratic	 transitions	and	 industrialization	
processes) but in part or in full experienced the latter two (broadcasting and internet 
diffusion), which are characterized by growing information abundance. Can Bimber’s 
book	help	us	in	understanding	processes	which	are	taking	place	in	the	Arab	world?	to	
what	extent	do	information	revolutions	make	“human	revolutions”	and	vice	versa?	Do	
we	find	the	same	mechanisms	characterizing	the	political	processes	which	took	place	
in Indonesia and in Chiapas discussed by the author also operating in the more recent 
Arab revolutions?
 The last point deserving discussion concerns normative questions such as poli-
tical inequality in the digital age as well as the fragmentation and polarization of the 
public sphere brought about by the internet. Concerning the former, Bimber notes two 
contrasting developments: on one side, post-bureaucratic political organizations are 
reducing the	influence	of	institutionalized	elites	and	the	weight	of	experts	in	politics;	
on the other side, access to the information environment is unequal and this form 
of exclusion overlaps with traditional socio-economic inequalities. Unfortunately, the 
steady narrowing of the digital divide in terms of access does not involve a decrease 
in	other	digital	inequalities	such	as	digital	skills.	The	multiple	dimensions	of	the	digi-
tal divide represent a serious threat to the concept of citizenship in contemporary 
societies where citizens’ rights can only be granted by fair and equal access and 
participation	 to	 information	 and	 communication	 flows.	As	 for	 the	 second	 normative	
question,	Bimber	discusses	the	cyber-transformation	of	the	public	sphere.	Here	again	
the picture is complex and portrayed by two contrasting dynamics: on the one hand, 
self-selection, individualization processes and personalized paths of information 
consumption	exacerbate	 the	 “balkanization”	of	 the	public	sphere	and	 the	decline	 in	
general interest; on the other hand, media concentration (which triggers heterogeneity 
and pluralism) could contribute toward common political communication and general 
understanding. The price of the decline of political intermediaries thus translates into 
less order, clarity, integration and coherence in the public sphere; Bimber states that 
big	media	conglomerates	could	possibly	counter-balance	this	trend.	However,	as	profit	
and	economic	interests	are	their	main	goals,	it	would	be	naïve	to	think	that	they	could	
preserve the orientation toward the common good of the public sphere, as theorized 
by	Habermas.
 To conclude, the author’s focus on technology as a driver of social and political 
change	 in	 terms	 of	 “skeptical	 optimism”	 represents	 an	 bridging	 the	 gap	which	 has	
characterized	at	length	this	field	of	study.	In	a	nutshell,	“information	technology	may	
have many effects at once. […] It is best to assume that it might both strengthen 
and	weaken	democracy,	as	well	as	exert	little	influence	on	some	democratic	proces-
ses”	(ibidem: 30). Bimber’s stance in between technological determinism and social 
constructionism	allows	him	 to	 illuminate	both	 the	 “light”	and	 “dark”	sides	of	 innova-
tion	processes.	In	sum,	Bimber’s	book	sheds	light	on	highly	relevant	methodological,	
empirical and normative issues related to information revolutions.
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what comes next?: bimber’s information revolUtions and institUtional 
disrUPtions
DaviD KaRpf
School of Communication and Information. Rutgers University. USA.
Bruce Bimber’s Information and American Democracy	is	a	pathbreaking	work	in	the	field	
of	internet	politics.		Ambitious	in	its	scope,	the	book	situates	the	rise	of	the	internet	in	a	
historical	context	of	previous	“information	revolutions,”	or	changes	in	“information	regi-
mes.”		In	so	doing,	the	book	makes	three	major	contributions:	historical,	theoretical,	and	
empirical.		Today,	nearly	a	decade	after	the	book	was	first	published,	it	is	high	time	to	con-
sider what comes next. In what directions should Information and American Democracy 
be extended, or built upon, to enrich our understanding of the interplay of information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) and political institutions? This essay will discuss 
each of these contributions in turn, and speculate on the areas where future researchers 
can and should extend the research agenda.
 Historically,	Bimber’s	main	contribution	lies	in	uniting	two	rarely-overlapping	fields	of	
historical	inquiry.	Many	works	provide	a	detailed	history	of	changing	information	techno-
logy.		Many	other	works	examine	the	rise	of	the	American	party	system,	and	of	political	
associations.		What	makes	this	book	unique	is	the	degree	to	which	it	unites	those	two	
research	traditions.		Read	alongside	such	works	as	Michael	Schudson’s	The Good Citi-
zen,	Stephen	Skowronek’s	Building a New American State, Paul Starr’s The Creation of 
the Media,	and	Theda	Skocpol’s	Diminished Democracy, Bimber provides his readers 
with	a	conceptual	framework	for	understanding	our	current	information	revolution.		The	
internet’s impact upon society is unique, but not unprecedented.  Previous information 
revolutions	likewise	produced	similar	periods	of	institutional	change.
	 Bimber’s	historical	discussion	occurs	within	a	single	chapter	of	the	book,	however.	
Necessarily brief, it provides a welcome puzzle for future scholars: how deep do these 
historical	ties	run?		What	would	a	more	fine-grained	theory	look	like?		In	particular,	since	
individual information and communication technologies are constantly in a state of diffu-
sion,	we	should	ask	what	 the	underlying	mechanisms	driving	party	and	 interest	group	
structural	 change	 look	 like.	At	what	 level	does	a	new	 technology	 rise	 to	 the	status	of	
“revolutionary,”	 and	do	 less-revolutionary	 information	 technologies	display	 similar	 fea-
tures?		How,	for	 instance,	does	the	rise	of	 the	answering	machine	or	cable	television,	
or	social	networking	sites	affect	the	costliness	of	information,	and	the	resulting	structure	
of political associations?  Information and American Democracy offers broad historical 
strokes.		A	closer	look	could	yield	substantial	additional	insights.
	 I	suspect	that	the	general	picture	Bimber	offers	of	four	“information	revolutions”	would	
be well-supported by a more nuanced account.  What we could gain, however, is a clea-
rer	picture	of	the	underlying	mechanics	at	work.	How	do	networks	of	actors	interact	with	
existing institutional structures?  Does change come from within or without?  This is parti-
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cularly important today, given Zysman and Newman’s (2007) discussion of the internet as 
“not	one,	but	a sequence of revolutions. It is a continued and enduring unfolding of digital 
innovation,	sustaining	a	long	process	of	industrial	adaptation	and	transition.”		Bimber’s	
research	was	 conducted	 before	 the	 rise	 of	 social	 networking	 sites,	YouTube,	 Twitter,	
or the blogosphere.  As the medium itself continues to evolve, it is incumbent upon the 
research	 community	 to	 sort	 through	 such	 boundary	 questions	 as	 “what	 constitutes	 a	
‘revolutionary’	ICT,”	and	what	impacts	we	should	expect	from	the	continual	development	
of the content and social layers of the World Wide Web.  An entire cottage industry has 
cropped up around such questions, with public intellectuals routinely offering pronoun-
cements	about	“networked	organizations,”	“twitter	revolutions,”	and	“organizing	without	
organizations.”		The	findings	of	Information and American Democracy are deeply salient 
to	those	debates,	but	would	find	increased	relevance	through	an	exploration	of	the	micro-
foundations of the theory.
 Theoretically,	the	book	makes	its	strongest	contribution	with	the	third	chapter,	“The	
Fourth	Information	Revolution	and	Postbureaucratic	Pluralism.”		Therein,	Bimber	discus-
ses	the	implications	of	“information	abundance”	for	American	political	associations.		He	
highlights four departures from the existing interest group environment: (1) the resources 
required for collective action will be fewer, (2) organizational boundaries will become more 
permeable	and	less	hierarchical,	leading	to	a	rise	in	short-term	“meta-organizations,”	(3)	
interest	group	membership	will	shift	from	interest-based	to	event-based	affiliations	and	
(4)	mobilizing	communications	will	become	better-targeted	and	less	broad-based	thanks	
to the availability of micro-targeted participant information.
 I would argue that all of these predictions have indeed come to pass.  Organizations 
like	MoveOn.org	have	redefined	membership,	disassociating	member	status	from	donor	
status	and	counting	all	of	their	e-mail	recipients	as	“members.”		They	have	limited	staffing	
and overhead costs, and frequently launch short-term meta-organizational campaign 
efforts.  Given the extent to which the internet of 2011 has evolved beyond the internet of 
2001, Bimber’s successful prediction is nothing short of astonishing.  Information abun-
dance and post-bureaucratic pluralism should hold a central place in the literature on the 
internet and politics, equal to such robust concepts as the digital divide and information 
cascades.
	 There	are	 two	areas	where	 the	 theoretical	 contribution	of	Bimber’s	work	could	be	
extended	further.		The	first,	which	is	the	subject	of	my	own	research,	lies	in	the	application	
of	Disruption	Theory	 (Christensen	1997)	 to	 the	field	of	political	associations.	 	Bimber,	
like	several	contemporary	scholars	(Diani	2000,	Chadwick	2007),	predicts	that	existing	
political associations will lead the way in adapting to the new information regime. Dis-
ruption	Theory,	by	contrast,	suggests	that	“revolutionary”	technological	innovations	yield	
an advantage to new entrants in an industrial sector, leading to the decline of existing 
companies.  Though primarily applied to business organizations, the tenets of disruption 
theory	apply	equally	well	to	the	non-profit	sector.		
 Through the lens of disruption theory, an interesting intersection emerges between 
Bimber’s	 work	 and	Theda	Skocpol’s	Diminished Democracy, also published in 2003. 
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Skocpol	likewise	offers	an	historical	account	of	the	transformation	of	American	political	
associations.  Information technology receives slim attention in her study, which highlights 
the generational displacement of longstanding cross-class membership federations by 
single-issue professional interest groups.  While Bimber explains the rise of these new 
interest	groups	through	a	focus	on	broadcast	communication	technologies,	Skocpol	focu-
ses	on	 the	 “rights-based	 framework”	emerging	 from	1960s-era	social	movements	and	
the changing opportunity structure created by Washington, D.C. bureaucratic institutions. 
These	two	books	should	be	read	in	conversation	with	one	another,	with	Bimber	providing	
an	explanation	of	the	changing	information	landscape,	and	Skocpol	providing	an	indica-
tion that the novel affordances of the new communications media were captured by a 
new generation of associations.  Indeed, I have found in my own research that there are 
clear differences between new, internet-mediated political associations and their longer-
standing counterparts in how they deploy novel ICTs (Karpf 2010).  The disruption of 
America’s interest group ecology remains a largely under-explored topic, and one which 
Bimber’s	theory	of	“postbureaucratic	pluralism”	should	strongly	influence.
 A second area for theoretical exploration lies in cross-national comparison.  Though 
the	title	of	Bimber’s	book	is	Information and American Democracy, the drivers of institu-
tional	change	he	identifies	should	be	in	operation	in	other	industrialized	Democracies	as	
well  (information abundance is hardly an America-centric phenomenon!).  Indeed, Diani 
(2000),	Bennett	(2003,	2004),	Chadwick	(2007),	and	Anstead	&	Chadwick	(2007)	have	
begun to develop such a cross-national research agenda.  This research is a complex 
undertaking	since	the	 interest	group	ecology	of	any	given	country	 is	a	function	of	 that	
country’s Electoral System. Democratic nations with Mixed-Member Proportional repre-
sentation develop different interest group systems than Democratic nations with Single 
Member, Simple Plurality representation.  Researchers thus cannot simply pool interest 
group data between democratic nations, creating challenges for comparative research 
efforts on this topic.
 Empirically,	the	enduring	value	of	Bimber’s	work	lies	in	the	set	of	early	case	examples	
it provides. These examples, such as his opening narrative of the Libertarian Party’s 
1999	mobilization	effort	against	a	proposed	‘Know	Your	Customer”	administrative	rule,	
provide a useful rejoinder against the journalistic enthusiasm that ensues whenever 
waves of internet-mediated political mobilization dominate the headlines. While the inter-
net	as	a	medium	may	constitute	a	 “series	of	 revolutions,”	 it	 is	useful	 to	 temper	public	
enthusiasm	over	“organizing	without	organizations”	by	asking	how,	if	at	all,	today’s	new	
media political campaign tactics are different from those of the previous decade (Karpf 
2010).  Bimber’s cases provide a valuable point of comparison in this regard.
 That said, the case examples in chapter 4 are, by necessity, the most limited element 
of	 the	book.	At	 the	 time	 it	was	written,	 the	postbureaucratic	 trend	amongst	 advocacy	
organizations	was	only	starting	to	emerge.		Groups	like	MoveOn	were	still	in	a	nascent	
phase	 of	 growth,	 and	 groups	 like	 Environmental	 Defense	 Fund	were	 enthusiastically	
deploying	a	first	 round	of	 “web	1.0”	political	 tools.	 	Environmental	Defense	Fund	pro-
vides a particularly telling example: founded in 1967, the group rebranded itself in the 
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late	1990s	as	“environmental	Defense.”		Staff	interviewees	explained	to	Bimber	that	this	
was	partially	because	of	their	commitment	to	the	new	digital	realm.		Since	the	book	was	
published,	the	group	has	reverted	to	its	previous	name.		Much	like	the	online	information	
hubs that rise to prominence and expire at a rapid, churning pace, the institutional path 
toward postbureaucratic pluralism is winding and dangerous for any one organization.
	 The	field	of	internet-mediated	political	organizations	has	been	heavily	influenced	by	
events	 that	 occurred	 since	 the	publication	of	 this	 book	—the	anti-war	movement,	 the	
Howard	Dean	campaign,	and	“web	2.0”	online	communities,	to	name	just	a	few.		New	
organizations and political consultancies have been formed in the intervening years, 
changing how political associations deploy information technology.  Both the progressive 
“netroots”	and	the	conservative	“tea	party”	have	supported	new	networks	of	technologi-
cally-savvy individuals and organizations who, in turn, shape the course of organizational 
activities	in	this	field.		As	such,	whereas	Information and American Democracy’s histori-
cal	and	theoretical	contributions	remain	impressively	robust,	the	book’s	empirical	case	
examples	have	become,	by	necessity,	somewhat	dated.		They	serve	as	a	marker	of	the	
state of technology adoption in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but more recent case 
examples provide a more robust picture of post-bureaucratic pluralism.
 Information and American Democracy	is	a	seminal	work	in	the	literature	on	the	inter-
net and politics. It stands the test of time surprisingly well —better than many contem-
porary	works.	The	sheer	scope	of	the	work	provides	ample	venues	for	future	research.	
Affiliated	researchers	should	take	up	the	challenge	of	developing	a	finer-grained	version	
of the historical analysis, investigate the implications of postbureaucratic organizations 
for the interest group ecology of America, engage in cross-national comparative research 
on the implications of information abundance, and update our empirical understanding of 
the	new	generation	of	advocacy	groups.		The	book	serves	as	a	starting	point	for	a	wide	
research agenda; one that deserves even wider attention than it has received thus far.
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online Political information and online Political ParticiPation
José Manuel Robles
Sección departamental de Sociología III. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Spain
One of the many virtues of Bruce Bimber’s Information and American Democracy. Tech-
nology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge University Press, 2003) is his effort 
not	to	make	the	study	of	the	relationship	between	politics	and	the	Internet	prisoner	to	the	
constant technical changes that affect this type of technology. In other words, his effort not 
to	place	technological	novelty	at	the	center	of	his	academic	reflection.	Bimber	analyzes,	
in a broad historical and theoretical context, the relationship between the features of infor-
mation in current society and the properties of political practices in American democracy. 
 From my point of view, this way of approaching the issue is fundamental because it 
avoids	what	I	believe	to	be	one	of	the	most	significant	limitations	in	our	area	of	research:	
the	tendency	to	consider	the	study	of	new	technologies	as	a	new	field	without	the	need	
to refer to previous historical experiences and, most importantly, to the basic theoretical 
concepts of sociology and political science. 
 This broad historical and theoretical review allows Bimber to show the close relation-
ship between the structure of information and the evolution of the democratic system in 
the	US.	Thus,	he	focuses	on	four	information	revolutions	and	identifies,	for	each	of	them,	
a set of effects on the shaping of power and of the social and political relationships in 
the United States. The last of these four revolutions is the result of the penetration of 
Information and Communication Technologies. 
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 By way of a summary, Bimber points out that changes in the way information is orga-
nized fundamentally affect the distribution of interests and how collective action is struc-
tured. On the other hand, these changes in the organization of information have far less 
significant	effects	on	individual	participation,	as	well	as	on	citizens’	civic	commitment.		
 These patterns of change in the physiognomy of information and their effects on poli-
tical	structure	could	fit	in	with	many	episodes	in	the	political	history	of	Spain.	For	instance,	
an episode we are about to celebrate: the drafting of the Spanish Constitution of 1812. 
	 My	knowledge	of	the	political	history	of	Spain	and	my	personal	academic	interests	
dissuade me from entering into this debate with the author. Instead, I will focus this 
discussion on the effects of the nature of information in the Internet era on political parti-
cipation.   
 In recent years, my research has focused on understanding the relationships bet-
ween new information and communication technologies, especially the Internet, and poli-
tical	participation	in	Spain.	From	the	start,	Bimber’s	work	under	discussion	here	became	
a	necessary	and	especially	valued	reference.	It	is	one	of	the	seminal	works	in	our	area	
of	research.	Its	conclusions	were	an	essential	point	of	reference	for	our	working	hypothe-
sis in the research project I am currently leading11. In this regard, we could say that my 
research team12 and I have already held a preliminary discussion with the author of the 
work.	We	are	lucky	to	have	this	opportunity	for	the	author	to	reply,	thus	closing	the	circle.	
 Given this precedent, my comments shall be based on some methodological and 
theoretical	reflections	we	have	made,	taking	as	reference	Bimber’s	work,	with	a	view	to	
setting	up	our	above-mentioned	research	project.	Likewise,	given	the	phase	this	project	
is in, we will be able to include in our comments some of the results obtained from our 
research. 
	 In	our	first	discussion	with	 the	author,	we	 focused	mainly	on	his	concept	of	 	post-
bureaucratic pluralism. From our point of view, one of Bimber’s most stimulating and 
enlightening	conclusions	in	the	book	is	that	the	fourth	technological	revolution	opens	up	
a process by which political information and communication are far less institutionalized 
than in previous periods. Information in the Internet era is more easily produced and 
distributed.	That	is,	the	Internet	becomes,	from	this	point	of	view,	a	technology	that	signifi-
cantly reduces the costs associated with the transmission and acquisition of information.
	 I	like	to	think	of	this	conclusion	in	iconographic	terms	as	a	transition	from	vertically	
organized	information	to	“horizontalized”	information.	As	the	author	himself	says	in	this	
discussion	section,	this	organization	of	information	makes	it	impossible	to	maintain	the	
previous system where amassing resources was a pre-requisite for political communica-
tion. As a result of the advent of the Internet, Bimber suggests, collective action does not 
 11 Research Project CSO2009-13771 of the National Research Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Science 
and Technology. 
 12 I	wish	to	make	special	mention	of	my	colleagues	Stefano	De	Marco	and	Mirko	Antino	without	whose	
collaboration, the research project could not have come about.
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require	to	the	same	extent	as	before	“substantial	staff,	money,	or	formalized	organization”	
(page 3 of B. Bimber’s text in this discussion section).
 In democratic terms, the decreased weight of organizational structures favors the plura-
lity and aggregation of interests. This adaptation of political organizations implies an increa-
sed	speed	of	political	processes,	as	well	as	“creating	conditions	for	a	shifting	competition	
over	political	information	among	a	wide-open	field	of	contestants	far	less	constrained	than	
at	any	time	in	the	past”	(page	3	of	B.	Bimber’s	text	in	this	discussion	section).
	 Taking	as	a	reference	these	ideas,	we	designed	our	empirical	analysis	for	the	case	of	
Spain. Firstly, we included in our research model not only traditional sources of political 
information such as media, political parties, etc., but also political communication that 
occurs among citizens through means such as email and newsletters. We believed that 
this	would	help	us	make	progress	along	the	line	of	research	proposed	by	Bimber.	If	the	
fourth information revolution brought about by the New Information and Communica-
tion Technologies resulted in decreased costs of production and distribution of political 
information,	the	information	distributed	by	citizens	via	this	means	had	to	be	taken	into	
account in the analyses of processes of political participation. In other words, in order to 
reproduce	the	“abundance	of	 information”,	we	thought	 it	was	interesting	to	include	the	
information citizens reproduce/produce and distribute through the Internet. 
 Along these same lines, we attempted to add complexity to the dependent variable: 
political participation. Together with the variables included by Bimber13, we introduced a 
set of political practices referred to in the literature as non-conventional political practi-
ces.	Among	 these,	were	attending	demonstrations,	going	on	strike	or	attending	 illegal	
political meetings. Lastly, we also included more recent political practices which are not 
easy to classify in either of the previous categories. Examples of these would be political 
consumerism, participation in alter-globalization political organizations, etc.
 In both cases, both for the dependent variable and for the independent variable, we 
applied a factorial analysis in order to deepen our understanding of the underlying cha-
racteristics of both variable constructs: political information and political participation. In 
the	case	of	political	participation,	we	wanted	to	know	to	what	extent	the	political	practices	
included in the analysis grouped together according to the usual theoretical categories 
(conventional political participation, non-conventional political participation and forms of 
participation not included in either of these two categories). In the case of political infor-
mation,	the	aim	was	to	perform	an	exploratory	analysis	and	our	interest	lay	in	finding	out	
the organization of the information-related variables.
 We found that the different types of participation grouped together as the theory pre-
dicted.	The	first	factor	included	all	conventional	political	practices	such	as	voting,	suppor-
ting a candidate, etc. The second factor included new non-conventional practices such 
 13 The	political	practices	Bimber	includes	in	his	analysis	represent	types	of	participation	defined	by	the	
literature as conventional political practices. Namely, voting, attending meetings, collaborating in a campaign, 
donating funds to a political party, etc. 
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as	demonstrations,	strikes,	etc.	Lastly,	new	political	practices	such	as	consumerism	or	
other alter-globalization social movements comprised a separate factor. The information 
variables	were	grouped	 into	 two	 factors.	The	first	 included	all	 the	variables	 related	 to	
traditional media or to political institutions that produce political information: watching or 
listening to TV or radio programs about politics, reading political information on media 
websites, reading newspapers, etc. The second factor was comprised of variables repre-
senting the exchange of political information among citizens through the Internet such as 
emails calling to attend demonstrations, receiving an email with information regarding a 
political manifesto, receiving an email with information on current affairs, etc. In sum, the 
first	of	the	factors	represented	information,	whether	or	not	received	through	the	Internet,	
which	originated	from	some	kind	of	formal	institution	or	organization,	whereas	the	second	
factor represented a set of practices of dissemination of political information among citi-
zens through the Internet. 
	 Taking	as	a	reference	Bimber’s	study,	we	use	the	two	factors	regarding	information	as	
independent variables and the three factors regarding participation as dependent varia-
bles	for	three	different	regression	analyses.	In	these	analyses	we	controlled	the	influence	
of the following variables (level of education, age, gender, social and economic status, 
interest	in	politics,	trust	in	society,	trust	in	public	institutions	and	perception	of	efficiency	of	
institutions).	According	to	the	results	of	our	analysis,	there	is	a	very	weak	relationship	bet-
ween	consumption	of	political	information	from	institutional	sources	(offline	and	online)	
and conventional political participation, non-conventional political participation and new 
forms of participation. We found that the relationship is stronger, although still mode-
rate,	in	the	case	of	conventional	participation.	However,	the	factor	representing	political	
information from emails, newsletters, etc. shows a relevant impact on the three types of 
political participation. In fact, together with interest in politics, it is the variable with the 
strongest weight on the dependent variable in the three analyses carried out. 
 The results of this analysis corroborate to a great extent some of the hypotheses 
set forth by Bimber. From our point of view, these results exemplify how, for the case of 
Spain,	 information	management	organizations	may	be	losing	part	of	 their	 influence	on	
collective action in favor of other less institutionalized ways of transmitting information. In 
fact,	our	analysis	shows	a	significant	relationship	between	receiving	this	type	of	emails	
with	political	 information	and	taking	part	 in	participative	activities	and	collective	action.	
Thus, emails with political information received by Internet users are, in the case of Spain, 
a stronger mobilizing stimulus than information accessible through other media such as 
newspapers, radio or television. This is especially the case with non-conventional politi-
cal practices and more innovative political practices included in our analysis. That is, they 
are particularly relevant for political practices that require a process of collective action.  
However,	in	this	analysis,	we	see	only	the	relationship	between	both	groups	of	variables	
and not the effect of this relationship. To this aim, we have formulated several hypotheses 
that will guide us in our qualitative phase whose aim is to further understand the effects of 
the	structure	of	information	in	current	society	on	participation	practices.	This	takes	us	into	
the	realm	of	speculation.	However,	we	think	that	given	the	context	and	nature	of	this	brief	
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contribution to the discussion, it is worth putting forward some ideas that may be useful 
for	future	research	related	with	Bimber’s	seminal	work.	
	 According	to	the	first	of	these	hypotheses,	in	a	context	defined	by	a	crisis	of	trust	in	
fundamental institutions such as the State or traditional media, information arriving from 
peers (friends, acquaintances, organizations sending previously requested updates, etc.) 
may be deemed more reliable. Political theory has deemed trust and social reciprocity to 
be determining factors of collective action. 
According	to	the	second	hypothesis,	unlike	traditional	media,	information	from	peers	is	
more aligned with the preferences and interests of the recipient. That is, both the infor-
mation from general media and that coming from mass political parties are aimed at 
the	“general	public”,	whereas	information	sent	to	a	mailing	list	or	to	a	specific	person	is	
designed	taking	into	account	the	recipient’s	characteristics.	It	is	precisely	for	this	reason	
that it may be a better stimulus for mobilization. 
 Lastly, it could be suggested that the costs associated with the search, storage 
and	handling	of	the	information	are	much	lower	if	you	belong	to	a	network	of	citizens	
than if you use traditional media. Based on some versions of the social capital theory, 
we suggest that one of the main advantages of social media is that they allow users 
to solve problems related with the cost of information and, thus, a great part of the 
problems	for	collective	action.	The	Internet,	from	this	point	of	view,	would	be	making	it	
cheaper to act. 
digital media and Political change: a resPonse to garcia, karPf, livingston, 
liU, mosca, and robles
bRuce biMbeR
Department of Political Science. University of California, Santa Barbara. USA.
At least three important developments involving digital media and politics have occurred 
since 2003 when Information and American Democracy was published. During the mid-
2000’s	 social	media	 emerged	 into	 the	marketplace	 and	 into	 people’s	 social	 practices	
around	the	globe.	Barack	Obama	ran	successfully	for	office	in	2008	employing	a	cam-
paign that relied more extensively and effectively on digital media than any in history. And 
in 2011, Arab Spring demonstrated how deeply embedded social media have become in 
non-routine politics as well. 
	 How	adequately	do	the	concepts	“information	abundance,”	“information	regime,”	and	
“post-bureaucratic	pluralism”	capture	the	state	of	digital	media	and	politics	in	the	US	and	
around the world today? In this forum, David Karpf is enthusiastic about how well some 
of	the	key	ideas	associated	with	these	concepts	have	played	out	in	practice	over	time.	
Lorenzo	Mosca	is	skeptical	in	a	positive	sense,	suggesting	that	organizationless	orga-
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nizing, which is increasingly visible in the world of social media, might be a step beyond 
post-bureaucratic pluralism.  
 It is clear now, as it was a decade ago, that organizations are not dead or dying, to 
be	supplanted	by	structurelessness	in	the	public	sphere.	It	 is	certainly	possible	to	find	
many	compelling	cases	of	organizationless	organizing,	as	Shirky	(2008)	has	done,	and	
as I have written about too (Bimber, et al., 2005; Flanagin, et al., 2006). It would be 
another matter entirely to believe that the evolution of organizing is tending toward a con-
dition	where	organizations	no	longer	are	important.		My	next	book,	Collective Action in 
Organizations: Interacting and Engaging in an Era of Technological Change, which is for-
thcoming from Cambridge University Press and co-authored with Andrew Flanagin and 
Cynthia Stohl, shows the continuing relevance of organizations to collective action.  We 
make	a	case	that	the	interesting	question	in	post-bureaucratic	pluralism	is	not	whether	
structurelessness replaces organizations, but rather how citizens participate in organiza-
tions when they also have so many opportunities to participate without them.
 Post-bureaucratic pluralism entails a complex portfolio of approaches to organizing: 
without	organization,	with	traditional	organization,	with	hybrid	organization,	in	networks	
of organizations.  This may be more evident now than it was in the early 2000s.  What is 
not	yet	fully	understood	is	just	how	these	organizational	complexes	work,	how	strategic	
actors	make	optimizing	decisions	when	they	now	have	many	choices	about	how	to	orga-
nize. As Karpf observes on this issue, the central idea of information-regime change is 
that	as	the	ecology	of	information	and	communication	changes,	so	too	will	linkage	orga-
nizations	and	the	structures	of	collective	action.		Liu	Gang	writes	that	the	“social	media	
revolution	has	done	nothing	if	not	accelerate	those	processes	of	information	revolution,”	
and that is certainly how I see many developments of the last decade. 
	 I	expected	when	I	wrote	the	book	that	many	readers	would	take	issue	with	my	defi-
nition of information, which is shaped by engineering and information theory as much as 
it is rooted in the disciplines of communication, sociology, and politics.  As things turned 
out,	not	many	readers	did	question	it.		But	José	Luís	Garcia	takes	up	the	issue,	noting	
that	 technologies	 hold	 the	 “singularity	 of	 acting	 on	 communicational	 realities	 genera-
ting	symbols,	meanings	and	culture,	through	text,	 image,	and	sound.”		He	argues	that	
communication	therefore	is	more	than	“mere	fluxes	of	information,	message	or	content	
between	sender	and	receiver.”		This	is	an	interesting	problem.		On	the	one	hand,	when	
symbols, meaning, interpretations and values are communicated, what moves is infor-
mation —representations of symbols and interpretations.  So information and communi-
cation	are	linked	in	this	way,	and	they	encompass	much	more	than	facts	or	the	contents	
of web sites, as Garcia suggests.  On the other hand, I do not dispute his insightful point 
that	 technology	 is	a	“means	to	think	with.”	 	This	 is	undoubtedly	right,	and	its	effect	on	
thought, expectations, and the production of meaning in the mind are not readily captured 
by	 information	concepts.	 	The	social	media	revolution	 is	making	more	clear	 than	ever	
that identity and social reality are shaped by the integration of technology into people’s 
lives, and these change civic norms and political practice.  Garcia’s argument about a 
redefinition	of	what	is	politics	and	democracy	is	a	compelling	one.
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 Information and American Democracy has been part of a long-running discussion 
about the extent to which digital media use has consequences for levels of political par-
ticipation and civic engagement; a topic that José Manuel Robles addresses. A good 
deal	more	is	known	about	this	problem	now	than	in	the	early	2000s,	though	the	weight	of	
evidence	still	points	to	what	are	at	best	very	modest	influences	on	participation	rates	in	
the US (Boulianne, 2009). 
 A lot of interest has focused on how political interest, as well as other motivation-
related factors, moderate relationships between technology use and behavior.  Beyond 
interaction effects, two aspects of the problem are emerging as central to the future of 
research in this area.  One is the clear fact that not all participation and engagement 
are	the	same.	Robles’	work	shows	that	it	is	important	to	differentiate	types	of	participa-
tion and forms of communication and information use, which reveal an underlying factor 
structure that have not yet been adequately described. Moreover, political actions that 
can be conducted entirely online, such as signing petitions or posting political comments, 
appear	 to	 show	 a	 quite	 different	 factor	 structure	 yet	 (Cantijoch	&	Gibson,	 2011).	 	As	
portfolios of political practice change, in part due to the integration of digital media into 
people’s lives, the old question of whether digital media increases participation rates 
overall, or in general, becomes increasingly inadequate. 
 It also appears increasingly evident that time and circumstance matter as the rela-
tionships between use of digital media and various political acts varies non-monotonically 
over	time	(Bimber	&	Copeland,	2011).		Digital	media	use	may	be	less	important	to	certain	
behaviors in one election or advocacy campaign than in the previous one, and then 
return to greater importance in the next.  At least in the US, how digital media are con-
nected to political behavior is contingent on motivation and age, on what the behavior 
of	interest	is,	on	the	context	in	which	the	behavior	takes	place,	as	well	as	on	the	social	
context of information and communication. 
 Both Robles and Lorenzo Mosca point out that recent developments in technology 
have placed citizens more prominently than ever in the position of producing information 
rather than simply consuming it. This is as great a challenge to traditional theories of 
political behavior as any.  As information now moves two ways —to and from citizens—
understanding its social context is increasingly important. Does a political message come 
from	my	“friend”?	From	many	friends?		Which	ones?	What	am	I	doing	at	the	moment	it	
arrives?	How	should	 I	 respond	publicly	 to	 this	message?	Robles	suggests	 rightly	 that	
understanding	how	people	think	about	such	questions	is	increasingly	crucial	to	compre-
hending political behavior. It is not enough to consider such classic problems as how 
much	people	trust	news	organizations	or	public	officials;	we	must	also	understand	how	
people’s	social	networks	legitimate	political	communication.
 Garcia, Mosca, and Liu all raise the topic of technological determinism, and I appre-
ciate Garcia noting that I do not fear being accused of the sin of somehow ascribing to 
this view, or more accurately, to some one of the range of views that acquire this label. Of 
course the adoption of technology, as well as the uses to which it is put, are contingent on 
many	things:	institutional	arrangements,	culture,	markets,	and	the	idiosyncrasies	of	his-
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tory. Mosca would locate the  argument of Information and American Democracy	“in	bet-
ween	technological	determinism	and	social	constructionism,”	which	is	quite	apt.		For	me,	
the central point is that one can identify certain crucial affordances of digital media that 
are common across nations and contexts. Among these are: choice, speed, horizontal 
communication,	and	the	breakdown	of	boundaries.	Naturally	these	do	not	look	the	same	
in all places, but it is indisputable that this general set of affordances, notwithstanding 
some variation from one place to another, are just very different from the affordances of 
broadcasting.	In	a	nutshell,	this	is	why	we	are	interested	in	digital	media	in	the	first	place.	
It	is	also	true,	generally	speaking,	that	these	new	affordances	appear	to	matter	in	many	
quite different contexts: in Egypt and China, and in Spain and the US.  
 Many of the ultimate outcomes of use of digital media will be radically different in 
these	places,	but	I	expect	that	how	political	mediation	works	will	be	affected	along	some	
similar	lines	across	contexts.		If	one	wished	to	apply	the	term	“technological	determinism”	
loosely to the idea that the same technology has some similar proximate human conse-
quences in very different places, then one would have to concede that digital media are 
showing	that	loose	definition	of	determinism	to	be	true.	
	 Part	of	the	change	in	the	nature	of	political	intermediation	involves	weakened	boun-
daries between the private and the public, between the social and the political, and bet-
ween the national and the global.  Steve Livingston notes insightfully that in any one 
political location —such as the US or rural Africa— the technological and organizational 
innovations that are associated with change may be occurring in some other location. 
The ecology of information and communication is indeed global, and so one can reaso-
nably	ask	whether	it	 is	adequate	to	talk	about	information	regimes	within	one	state.		It	
is clear that the rapidly changing ecology of information and communication gives less 
control over agendas, message framing, and political attention to organizations in any 
one state, as well as less capacity to solve problems of information and communication 
through organizational adaptations of their own, independently of what is happening glo-
bally.	The	problem	Livingston	identifies	is	that	of	the	state	in	global	context	where	national	
boundaries and institutions matter less —but still matter. The exogenous pressures on 
political	 intermediaries	and	networks	are	greater	 than	ever,	as	he	notes.	 	At	 the	same	
time,	this	globalization	of	networked	communication	is	likely	to	further	advantage	post-
bureaucratic	strategies	for	political	organizing	as	political	actors	find	that	flexible,	networ-
ked	structures	that	share	agency	with	others	are	often	successful	as	adaptations	to	this	
new global context.  The strategies of political organizing and collective action associated 
with	the	early	part	of	the	digital	media	revolution	are	likely	to	become	ever	more	adaptive,	
rather than less, in the global political ecology. At the same time, he is right that we can 
not	understand	sufficiently	the	character	of	the	linkages	between	information	and	political	
organization	by	confining	our	view	to	any	one	nation.
	 A	good	many	of	the	most	significant	developments	anywhere	in	the	world	involving	
digital media and politics were occurring inside the US up through roughly the time of 
Barack	Obama’s	election.	Then	things	changed	substantially.	Since	2008,	it	is	increasin-
gly	clear	that	most	of	the	significant	developments	are	happening	outside	the	US.		They	
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will	surely	continue	to	do	so	indefinitely.	There	are	clear	reasons	why	political	momentum	
with	digital	media	happened	to	start	 in	the	US:	most	of	 the	computing	and	networking	
technologies were developed in the US; these emerged into a pluralistic political lands-
cape dominated by a body of competing interest groups eager to exploit any new tool, 
and featuring a campaign system driven by competitive candidate campaign organiza-
tions that are constituted from scratch each season, rather than organized by enduring 
and institutionalized party organizations.  In this regard, the US had a head start, but at 
the same time it is a nation where opportunities for dramatic political change are limited. 
As	Karpf	notes,	information	abundance	is	hardly	confined	to	the	US.	On	the	contrary,	the	
US,	like	most	post-industrial	democracies,	has	enjoyed	a	state	of	plentiful	political	infor-
mation	and	communication	for	a	long	while:	through	competitive	markets	for	mass	media,	
through civil liberties involving speech and association, through healthy civil society and 
generally good access to education.  In such places, information abundance in the digital 
media era merely expands information richness from the age of mass media.  This is not 
the case in many parts of the world, where the leap from greatly circumscribed political 
information to abundance is a radical one.  
	 One	of	the	most	compelling	places	to	take	that	leap	is	China,	about	which	Liu	Gang	
writes	that	“new	technology	will	sooner	or	later	change	the	political	scenario.”	The	Chi-
nese	government	is	walking	a	tightrope	with	digital	media,	as	he	implies.	The	Chinese	
state	has	already	conceded	much	if	it	acknowledges	that	it	can	not,	as	Liu	writes,	keep	
politics	and	political	discussion	“within	the	government”	because	of	digital	media.		Its	poli-
cies of censorship and online propaganda are aimed at silencing high-level dissent and 
preventing	“drastic”	events	that	could	potentially	threaten	the	legitimacy	of	the	state	itself,	
but Beijing tolerates non-threatening political discussion, as well as online advocacy 
aimed at local-level issues. The latter involves use of digital media to expose corruption in 
low-level bureaucrats or discrimination in hiring or education, or to deal with such issues 
as local environmental problems (Yang, 2009). Those can be framed as bringing the 
bureaucracy	into	more	direct	and	indirect	contact	with	citizens,	improving	the	efficiency	
of the state apparatus, one its putative superiorities over democratic institutions. The 
challenge the Chinese state faces is therefore twofold: continuing to repress high-level 
dissent, which is much harder due to digital media, and containing safe political advocacy 
online so that its agenda does not creep into forbidden issues. Key to how this balancing 
act unfolds are the nascent civil society organizations in China dealing with environmen-
tal	issues,	health,	education,	non-discrimination,	and	the	like.	The	People’s	Republic	of	
China	may	be	confronting	its	first	information	revolution,	and	how	that	unfolds	is	likely	to	
be a function of the interplay between these organizational forms and the affordances of 
digital media. 
	 The	 developments	 of	 Arab	 Spring	 have	 moved	 faster.	 To	 invoke	 the	 theory	 of	
punctuated equilibrium that Livingston describes in connection with information revolu-
tions, these developments are without a doubt a punctuation in what was for a long time 
an unhappy equilibrium. The conditions to which people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and 
elsewhere responded in 2011 had been present across North Africa and the Middle East 
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for	years:	police	violence	and	repression,	lack	of	civil	liberties,	and	poverty.		Punctuations	
are	intrinsically	unpredictable	in	advance;	likewise,	in	retrospect	all	complex	events	have	
more than one starting point. One of the starting points of Arab Spring was Mohamed 
Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia.  Another was the recurrence of rising food prices. 
And a third was the practice that Egyptians gained in the years following the April 6, 2008 
Youth Movement with political communication and organizing through digital media.  By 
the	time	that	President	Ben	Ali	 left	Tunisia,	Facebook	was	the	third	most	popular	web	
site in Egypt and it was without question a political medium.  Of course Egyptians used it 
when	they	rose	up	against	Mubarak,	and	it	allowed	them	to	do	things	not	easily	done	so	
rapidly without it. 
 Whether the changes unfolding across North Africa and the Middle East now are 
eventually consolidated into democracies or something else remains to be seen.  From 
the	perspective	of	 the	theory	of	 information	regimes,	 the	questions	are:	What	kinds	of	
political intermediaries form and how do they adapt to the new ecology of information and 
communication there?  Do civil society organizations evolve and exploit the horizontal 
communication	power	intrinsic	in	digital	media?		How	does	the	availability	of	new	forums	
expand	political	voice?	 	How	are	political	parties	advantaged	or	disadvantaged	 in	 this	
new	environment?		“Liberation	technology,”	as	it	came	to	be	called	by	some	in	early	2010,	
does not create change, but across many parts of the globe, it creates opportunities for 
organizing.		David	Karpf	suggests	in	this	forum	that	Theda	Skocpol’s	fine	book	Diminis-
hed Democracy be read in conversation with Information and American Democracy.  As I 
survey	the	global	picture	of	digital	media	and	politics	at	the	moment,	I	am	most	influenced	
now by Guobin Yang’s The Power of the Internet in China,	 and	Phil	Howard’s	Digital 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam. 
	 The	first	influential	discussion	of	politics	and	what	we	now	call	“digital	media”	dates	
from	the	mid-1990s,	 in	books	such	as	Larry	Grossman’s	The Electronic Republic, and 
Elections in Cyberspace, edited by Anthony Corrado and Charles Firestone.  Since these 
early,	speculative	works,	which	now	seem	quaint,	a	lot	of	analysis	has	focused	on	ques-
tions	framed	roughly	as:	“Do	digital	media	cause	political	change?”	This	question	is	not	
quite right. Digital media are changing the ecology of information and communication, 
just as other innovations have done so in the past, and that in turns alters political oppor-
tunities, especially at the organizational level. As Mosca observes, one of my aims in 
Information and American Democracy was to help bring information in from the periphery 
—at best— of the study of American politics, and locate it more centrally as a concept 
relevant	 to	 political	 change.	Historically,	 political	 change	and	 changes	 in	 the	 informa-
tion	and	communication	ecology	have	been	interlinked,	exhibiting	a	pattern	of	stability	
followed by abrupt change. What this means at present is: When people act politically, 
they	often	use	digital	media.	This	formulation	is	more	instructive	than	asking	whether	digi-
tal	media	make	more	people	act	politically.	The	developments	of	the	last	decade	show	
that	“online”	and	“offline”	worlds	of	politics	—in	both	democracies	and	dictatorships—	are	
more integrated than ever, and that politics in the current ecology of information and 
communication has a different shape and character than politics in previous eras.
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